This paper introduces a technique for measuring the degree of (in)coherence of inconsistent sets of propositional formulas. The coherence of these sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal models of those sets in G. Priest's Logic of Paradox. The compatibility of the information expressed by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be measured with this technique. In this way, Hunter's objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for measuring (in)coherence are addressed.
Introduction
The development of techniques for measuring the amount of information and the degree of coherence of inconsistent sets of formulas has been recently addressed in the literature. E. Lozinskii [6] regards the inconsistent data in a set of formulas S of a knowledge system as a result of information pollution. He assumes, nevertheless, that such a set must contain a meaningful subset that has to be maximally consistent in order not to lose any valuable data. Therefore, adapting Shannon's formula for the calculation of the information content of a message, Lozinskii maintains that the quantity of semantic information contained in S is a decreasing, and logarithmic, function of the size of the set of models of the maximally consistent subsets of S.
Wong and Besnard [10] point out that Lozinskii's technique is defective in two respects: the presence of tautologies affects the information value of a set of formulas, and his information measure is syntax-sensitive in the presence of inconsistencies, which yields counterintuitive results. Wong and Besnard modify Lozinskii's definition using the paraconsistent logic QC (Quasi-Classical Logic) [1] to measure the amount of information contained in inconsistent sets of prepositional formulas and overcome the shortcomings of Lozinskii's approach.
Several systems of paraconsistent logic, i.e., logics that do not have ex contradictione quodlibet as a valid rule, which involve a weakening of classical logic have been presented in the literature. Two alternative taxonomies for these paraconsistent logics can be found in [2] and [9] . In the case of Quasi-Classical Logic paraconsistency is achieved by restricting the proof theory so that compositional proof rules like Addition cannot be followed by decompositional rules like Resolution. The reader's acquaintance with Quasi-Classical Logic and its semantics is assumed throughout this paper.
A. Hunter [4] criticizes Wong and Besnard's definition as an inconsistency measure because it does not provide a direct measure of inconsistency and, for example, yields the same value for {A} and {A, ¬A, B}. Hunter uses minimal QC models to measure the inconsistency of a set of formulas with those models. He defines a measure of inconsistency called coherence in terms of minimal QC models.
In this paper Hunter's objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for measuring inconsistency are addressed. Furthermore, a measure of inconsistency which resorts to such a logic, Priest's Logic of Paradox [7] , is introduced. The coherence of inconsistent sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal LP-models of those sets. The compatibility of the information expressed by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be measured with this technique.
LP-models
Priest's Logic of Paradox LP is a truth-functional many-valued paraconsistent logic which provides models for (classically) inconsistent sets of formulas using Kleene's strong three-valued matrices [5] . Priest reads the middle value b of Kleene's strong matrices as both true and false and takes it as a designated value together with t (true), thus providing (classically) inconsistent sets of formulas with three-valued models and restricting their consequences.
Let L be a finitary propositional language and P the set of its propositional letters. The following definitions characterize the notions of LP-interpretation, LP-model and LPconsequence for this logic:
Definition 1 (LP-interpretation). An LP-interpretation is a function I LP from P into the set T 3 = {t, b, f } of truth values, which is extended to the molecular formulas of L by means of Kleene's strong three-valued matrices:
In the following section a notion of minimally inconsistent LP-model will be used; it must be pointed out, though, that the notion defined bellow is related, but not equivalent, to the one Priest defines in [8] . Priest uses this notion to develop a non-monotonic version of his LP logic. 
Measuring coherence using minimally inconsistent LP-models
A. Hunter argues that his QC logic is better suited for the purpose of measuring inconsistency than other paraconsistent logics. For example, Priest's three-valued logic LP is able to provide models for inconsistent sets of formulas like {A, ¬A ∨ ¬B, B}. But, there are three LP-models for this set while it has only one QC minimal model. According to Hunter, the gob of models underspecifies the nature of the conflicts.
The number of models for inconsistent sets of formulas can be reduced if minimally inconsistent LP-models, instead of LP-models, are used. In the case of the set {A, ¬A ∨ ¬B, B} this number is reduced from three to two; this example also shows that there can be more than one minimally inconsistent LP-model of a set of formulas.
In what follows a measure of inconsistency will be defined using minimally inconsistent LP-models, but avoiding the objections above. The inconsistency of a set of formulas Γ is defined in terms of the inconsistency number of Γ : The inconsistency function can now be characterized as follows: Definition 6 (Inconsistency function). The inconsistency function from sets of well-formed formulas of L into [0, 1] is defined:
where Pl(Γ ) denotes the number of different propositional letters occurring in Γ . A related measure of inconsistency, the coherence of a set of formulas Γ , can be defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Coherence function). The coherence function from sets of well-formed formulas of L into [0, 1] is defined:
Example 3. Let Γ = {¬p, ¬q, p ∨ q, ¬s ∨ r, ¬r ∨ s}; then Inconsistency(Γ ) = 1 − 0.25 = 0.75.
Measuring relative compatibility
When several sources provide information about the same situation each source of information must be evaluated according to criteria designed to measure their comparative reliability. Formal models of information evaluation have been offered in the literature; for example, Laurence Cholvy formalizes in [3] the recommendations offered by NATO concerning the information evaluation in intelligence.
One of the criteria used to evaluate a source of information is its compatibility with some previously reported information or some established knowledge, i.e., with the background knowledge. For example, our background knowledge may be that an observed object is a plane or an helicopter, and that if the altitude of the observed object is less than 3 km then the object is not a plane. If several sources provide us with information about this situation, i.e., about the kind of aircraft observed and its altitude, one of the criteria to evaluate their reliability will be the compatibility of the information offered with that background knowledge.
The coherence function defined in the previous section can be used to measure and compare the compatibility of different information sources Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n , each one of which will be assumed to be self-consistent, with the domain or background knowledge ∆: Definition 8 (Relative consistency of a source with the background knowledge). A source Σ i is more consistent than another source Σ j with the background knowledge ∆ if and only if Coherence(Σ i ∪ ∆) > Coherence(Σ j ∪ ∆). Example 4 (Hunter) . Let the background knowledge ∆ = {p ∨ q, ¬r ∨ s}, and the first information source Σ 1 = {¬p, ¬q, p ∨ q}, while the second information source Σ 2 = {¬p, ¬q, r, ¬s}. The information source Σ 1 is more consistent with the background knowledge ∆ than information source Σ 2 because Coherence(Σ 1 ∪ ∆) = 0.75 and Coherence(Σ 2 ∪ ∆) = 0.50.
Conclusion
In this paper a many-valued paraconsistent logic, Priest's Logic of Paradox, has been used to offer direct measures of the (in)coherence of classically inconsistent sets of propositional formulas.
The minimal models of Priest's LP logic can also be used to measure the comparative compatibility of the information provided by different sources with the background knowledge. This measure of comparative compatibility is one of the criteria used to evaluate the reliability of those sources.
This sort of applications show, as Wong and Besnard point out, that a system of paraconsistent logic can have a role that goes beyond the task of identifying valid forms of inference, and can be used as a tool for analyzing the information contained in (possibly inconsistent) sets of formulas.
The measures of (in)coherence in information provided by different paraconsistent logics and their comparative plausibility from an intuitive point of view deserve further research.
